[Open] Ethiopia and Djibouti : from Chinese protectorates in the making ?

The development of economic partnerships between China and the African continent has more than tripled since the beginning of the 21st century. In effect, while China was the first economic partner of some countries in 2000, it became so for more than thirty countries at the beginning of the decade 2020. Its rapid success is based on several factors : loans and financial grants much less demanding than those granted by the IMF and the World Bank, the development of many infrastructures as a “gift”, the flood of low-cost Chinese goods on African markets – and therefore accessible to the most precarious social classes. This politico-economic success is also based on the symbolic dimension of these new partnerships. : Beijing has developed a polished image with African governments : China does not have the colonial past of European powers, it was thus one of the countries present at the non-aligned conference in Bandung (Indonesia) in 1955.

Above all, it is staged around partnerships win-win, win-win, who aim, theoretically to develop exchanges supposed to be fairer than those, neocolonials, western powers. If China wanted to stand out from the West in its speeches, what about his actions ?

European powers from the 19th centurye century and China in the 21ste century embody two historical moments of economic penetration, political and military of foreign actors on the African continent. Certainly, cultural and historical contexts differ, they nevertheless make it possible to analyze what is called the “logic of empire” by highlighting the similarities or borrowings, but also the additions or differences that appear from one penetration model to another. Right away, the similarities are striking : lhe debt policy practiced by Beijing in Kenya may soon give it control of the port of Mombassa, thus recalling the way colonial France used the debt to occupy Tunisia in the 19th century.e century[1] or, that of the English vis-à-vis Egypt at the same time. In a more continental approach, the policy of control over African ports by China (Kenya, Djibouti, Sudan, Nigeria, Togo) confirms the importance of the coastline in the logic of extroversion and control of exchanges between local African economies with the rest of the world [2]. As for the continent's natural resources, China has developed a cooperation policy increasingly oriented towards their extraction and exploitation on its own account [3]. These resources extracted, secure infrastructure is needed to transport them to the seafront, then to mainland China. Fact, this situation calls into question the similarities with the development model of the colonies (resource exploration and exploitation) by France on the African continent until the years 1940 [4]. This extractivist model could be summed up like this : the colonial power builds a port – a trading post – on the coast, set up its military force there, there develops an axis towardshinterland, space conducive to the establishment of an extractivist economy, whether mining or agricultural. Or, China seems to have taken over this model of extraction which it has tried to apply several times on the African continent. Among these anchor points, the corridor from the port of Djibouti to the Ethiopian hinterland seems to serve as a showcase for Sino-African cooperation.

This axis of cooperation between China, Djibouti and Ethiopia proves to be essential for Beijing. In addition to the geopolitical issues of the new Silk Roads between Asia and Europe, it represents the most significant attempt at integration made by China on the African continent. In effect, China has practiced a major investment policy since the beginning of the 21ste century. She has in particular massively invested in the port sector in Djibouti (65% you PIB [5]), it controls more than two-thirds of the Doraleh container terminal (Djibouti City), le port du Ghoubbet (exploitation of salt from Lake Assal) and that of Tadjoura (potash from Ethiopia). It has financed various infrastructures in the form of a loan or a grant for a total cost of more than 14 billion dollars since 2012 [6] : routes, stadiums, administrative buildings, a hospital, a free zone of 48 km2 near the container port as well as a railway line linking the port of Djibouti to Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital. Chance of history, if this railway line was officially inaugurated in 2016, it was put into service in January 2018, hundred years after the inauguration of the Franco-Ethiopian railway line of 1918. Finally, China set up its first military base on African soil in 2017. In total, China controls more than 80% of Djibouti's public debt at the beginning of the decade 2020.

Clip of the Chinese army from the base in Djibouti, 2022 (HERE if viewing problem).

On the other side of the border, in Ethiopia, China is also present. It has become Ethiopia's leading economic partner since the start of the decade. 2010 And this, regardless of the Ethiopian civil war which shook up political agendas. As for Djibouti, China has invested heavily (400 Chinese investment projects for a value of more than 13 billion dollars in loans [7]), Beijing controls more than half of Ethiopia's foreign debt (26 billions of dollars [8]). Besides the Djibouti-Ethiopian Railway, China has funded the Addis Ababa metro (475 millions of dollars), the headquarters of the African Union (saturated with microphones), the Addis Ababa ring road (86 millions of dollars), as well as the great Renaissance dam (1,8$ billion granted generally to improve the electricity distribution network). Through these funds, China materializes its institutional shift, from a “friendly” country to an international donor thanks to the Eximbank of China, a state bank with 1,8 billions of dollars, competing with international institutions such as the IMF or the World Bank.

Beyond the financial aspect, Beijing matters on a broad diplomatic apparatus including various aspects of cooperation. The friendly staging around the alliances between Sino-Ethiopian peoples and leaders goes hand in hand with the development of a strong policy of agricultural cooperation. It would be close to 500 Chinese teachers who would have trained 60 000 teachers, students and agricultural technicians for nearly twenty years[9]. In this, the Ethiopian agricultural sector remains crucial in the Chinese strategy. Ethiopia has the largest cattle herd in Africa, China has naturally set up many tannery and textile companies there in the free zones on the outskirts of Addis Ababa. In addition, according to Beijing, close to 200 000 Chinese would live in Ethiopia, making this foreign – extra-African – community the most important. Or, the presence of these workers directly influences the vision that the Chinese have of Ethiopia. The last few years have thus been marked by the development of a new form of exoticism vis-à-vis Ethiopian women..

An expat talks about the face of an Ethiopian woman by comparing her features with Europeans (from 03:00) (HERE if viewing problem).

These are nicknamed " black pearls » by Internet users on forums and websites dedicated to Ethiopia and feedback from Chinese workers[10]. Photos abound on these sites and questions related to sexuality and physical criteria of beauty are consulted by several million Internet users., taking up the racial classifications put in place during the colonial era[11]. We learn there, in addition, that Ethiopian women are the most beautiful in Africa because, unlike other women on the continent, they don't have a line negroids »[12]. Chinese enthusiasm for Ethiopian women reflects growing interest in Africa, interests correlated to the Chinese economic situation[13].

Beyond all these economic data, What is the assessment of the presence – of the possible seizure – of China on this Djibouti-Ethiopia corridor? ? Et, more generally, logics of empire that appear implicit in this cooperation ? Right away, it seems obvious that China does not wish to "restart" the colonial experience in Africa as the West carried out in the last century. It is not a question here of occupying and administering territories – as such, Beijing is considering setting up a second military base, this time, on the Atlantic coast, in Equatorial Guinea[14]. However, it is clear that Beijing operates a selection vis-à-vis the African territories, taking over the most promising spaces, especially those playing the role of interface between the local economy and the global economy. Besides the resources, it is therefore not so much the African continent that interests him as such but more the political and economic scope of the control of the interface between African societies and the world space., interface which of course goes through port control, but also by that of debt as a weapon or diplomatic support. Also, China places itself here as the new guarantor of the logic of extraversion[15] for African elites. The latter actually see in the arrival of Beijing the revival of the logic of dependencies as a possible economic rent for postcolonial states even as European countries are increasingly reluctant to finance certain regimes where the elites in place drag on in power.. Therefore, if China indirectly allows the maintenance of certain African elites, she forms, herself, the new elites of tomorrow. For exemple, in Djibouti where the battle for the succession to Ismaël Omar Guelleh (in power since 1999) began[16], some Djiboutians are already ironic about the power that will subtly “win” the elections : a hypothetical candidate supported by France, the Americans or by China.

Par: Alexandre Lauret , doctor of anthropology, geography at the University of Paris 8, Horn of Africa specialist, and your servant Noah Hirsch.

 

[1] Eric Toussaint, « Let this, the French weapon of the conquest of Tunisia », Orient XXI, 7 July 2016.

[2] Jean-Francois Bayart, “Africa in the world : a story of extroversion », International criticism, n°5, 1999, pages 97 at 120.

[3] Julien Wagner, China Africa, the great plunder, Eyrolles, 2014. 128 pages.

[4] Frederick Cooper, Africa since 1940, Payot Editions & Shorelines, 2012, 411 pages.

[5] Sonia Le Gourielec, Djibouti, the giant politics of a small state, Northern University Press, 2020, p.165.

[6] Sonia Le Gourielec, op.cit. p. 178.

[7] Figures given by the BBC, 2019 – lien.

[8] Idem

[9] Yunnan Daily, august 2020 – lien.

[10] Beautiful women like clouds" Ethiopia's current situation，Take you to see the cold knowledge of Ethiopia – Zhihu, 2022.

[11] “Are Ethiopian girls beautiful – Oui, their beauty is entirely in line with Chinese standards” – Zhihu, 2017 ; 1,8 million views.

[12] “Are Ethiopian girls the most beautiful in Africa ?” Zhihu, 2018.

[13] Some analysts believe that the Chinese presence in Africa is intimately linked to the internal situation of the country : it is a question of both finding new markets to sell the goods produced in China while allowing many Chinese to emigrate to prevent them from joining the ranks of possible incipient mass unemployment.

[14] Claude Fouquet, “China would be tempted to set up a permanent military base in Equatorial Guinea”, The echoes, 6 december 2021.

[15] For more details on these extraversion logics : Jean-Francois Bayart, The State in Africa : belly politics. Karthala.

[16] « Succession d’IOG : the president and his entourage decimate the ambitious”, Africa Intelligence, 18/03/2022.