PARPCC #24 – Take Back Control : Xi Jinping and the People's Liberation Army

Although in the service of the Chinese Communist Party, the army has been able to benefit from a certain autonomy vis-à-vis the Party since the years 1950. Transition from a state of fusion under Mao Zedong, embodied by the adage “the Party commands the guns”, she emancipates herself with Deng, and this in order to promote the development of the capabilities to wage an external war. The arrival of Xi Jinping to power in 2012 signaled the “end of recess” and the tightening of the CCP’s grip on the military sphere. How Xi regained control and what are the risks associated with these changes ?

Chinese law is very clear : the People's Liberation Army (APL) is in the service of the Chinese Communist Party. This is common in communist regimes and very different from the functioning of democracies., in which the armies are ultimately at the service of the nation, and so, People. Huntington thus describes civil-military relations in democracies as “objective civil control” and “subjective civil control” – understand having a determined political color – civil-military relations observable in China. In both cases, however, this balance must make it possible to constitute an effective army (capable of defending the country) without threatening the political status quo.

Before Xi came to power in 2012, the harmful consequences of a very civil-military relationship “flexible” were felt : 1) the PLA carried out operations without informing civilian officials and without apparent concern for their international repercussions (ex: the crash of the EP-3 in 2001) ; 2) the PLA was highly corrupt and 3) the ideological imprint of the Party on the PLA was very weak, raising fears of a “color revolution” supported by the army and fomented from abroad, or a refusal to obey in the event of an internal crisis/revolt.

Selon Wuthnow and Saunders, Xi Jinping pursued a policy of 4 time to bring the army back to the “right path” of the Party:

1) he strengthened his own role within the army by becoming heavily involved in military rituals (56 appearances in 3 ans) but also by resuming his role as president of the Central Military Commission from the hands of the Vice-President (a career soldier) who had been sitting for many years.

2) he appointed allies to key positions in the PLA and removed around a hundred generals for corruption, while strengthening the geographic rotation of officers.

3) he integrated “ideological controls” as in state enterprises, reformed the bureaucracy of the Central Military Commission to ensure the feedback of information from various sources, created toll-free numbers allowing anonymous denunciations, etc.

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4) he strengthened ideological education at all levels, especially the highest, from APL.

Xi has largely achieved his initial objectives, even if the CCP has still not completely brought the PLA into line. The army's lack of transparency on its operations would have, according to the authors, embarrassed the Chinese political elite when a spy balloon flew over the United States from 28 January to 4 february 2023. The recent dismissal of China's Defense Minister also reflects continued mistrust between the Party elite and the PLA. Finally, the reforms carried out by Xi have above all strengthened the link between the army… and Xi himself. The Party-Army link being poorly institutionalized, Wuthnow and Saunders anticipate the risk of a crisis during the next transfer of power.

Reference: Wuthnow, Joel & Saunders, Phillip C. (2024) “More Red but Still Expert: Party-Army Relations Under Xi Jinping”, Journal of Contemporary China, pp. 1-16.