PARPCC#22 – What do Chinese researchers think of Russia? ?

After Russia invaded Ukraine, commentators have widely relayed elements suggesting a Sino-Russian rapprochement : intensified trade, a “friendship without limits”, tacit diplomatic support for Russian aggression, etc. But what about the community of Chinese experts and researchers close to power? : how the war in Ukraine changed the way they view Russia ?

By sifting through the writings of the most influential figures of think tanks Chinese close to power, Sagild and Hsuing show that the invasion of Ukraine did not fundamentally change the primary motivations for the Sino-Russian rapprochement.

For Chinese researchers, this cooperation is based above all on the need to manage a common and long border 4200 km with its largest direct neighbor. On the other hand, since Wagner's aborted mutiny, Added to these ‘basic’ geopolitical reasons is the need to prevent the potential instability of the Russian regime..

At the military level, and like their Russian colleagues, Chinese experts see invasion of Ukraine as inevitable outcome of NATO's eastern enlargement. They see the Russian-Ukrainian conflict as a 'proxy' war being played out between Russia and the United States.. Nevertheless, the invasion of Ukraine, preceded by numerous illegal Russian actions (notably the annexation of Crimea in 2013), raises among researchers the fear of Russian expansionism in its neighborhood which could one day affect the Chinese border regions. This threat is relatively tempered by China's harsh judgment of Russian military performance in Ukraine..

At the economic level, the war in Ukraine reinforced the idea, in Beijing, that the Sino-Russian relationship would be asymmetrical. Faced with Russia’s immoderate use of hydrocarbons as a bargaining chip in international negotiations, Chinese researchers support the need today for diversification in Beijing's energy supplies.

Finally, it is on the diplomatic level that the perceptions of Chinese experts have evolved the most since 2022. Even if they consider that Russia and China share the desire for a more accommodating world order, the risk of a marginalized China, if Beijing were to continue to deepen its partnership with Russia, is important to them.  

See Also

#PARPCC 21 – Put the PCC back at the center : Xi’s “ideological campaigns”

In sum, Chinese experts' perception of Russia has evolved unevenly since Russian aggression against Ukraine. It remains largely based on the same principles which favored the rapprochement of the two actors before the war.. However, for Sagild and Hsiung, the vision expressed by Chinese analysts on the military and diplomatic aspects shows a solution for Western countries: only a partnership with Russia that has become “too costly” could significantly change China’s posture towards its neighbor.

Reference: Sagild, Rebecca Asnes; Hsuing, Christopher Weidacher (2024), “Chinese Re-examinations of Russia: the Strategic Partnership in the Wake of Russia’s War Against Ukraine”, Journal of Contemporary China, pp.1-16.